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Can the Jury Survive after the Judgment
of the European Court of Human Rights
in Taxquet v. Belgium?
Károly Bárd*
It was Professor Damasˇka who introduced me to the American jury system in
Salzburg at the summer seminar on American Studies in Schloss Leopoldskron al-
most forty years ago. Perhaps I may say that after his lectures I understood something
about the American criminal justice and the common law type jury system which
before appeared to me a somewhat exotic institution. But Professor Damasˇka not
only made me understand the operation of American criminal justice but taught
me to be cautious when making assertions about the sharp differences between
the adversarial and the non-adversarial systems and suggested to rather search for
the common objectives which are accomplished by different means in the two sys-
tems.1
Professor Damasˇka also contributed to gaining a more realistic and objective view
of the inquisitorial process of the Middle Ages which generally is associated with
cruelty and a complete disregard of principles that we today would term “due process
guarantees”. He convincingly showed us that there had in fact been defense safe-
guards in the criminal process of the ancient regime too.2 At the same time he sug-
gested to review or at least to refine the popular opinion on the “superiority” regard-
ing procedural safeguards of the law in England as practiced between the 13th and the
18th century. Among others he pointed to the testimonial and adjudicative functions,
both performed by the same body, namely the self-informing jury3 or that until the
middle of the 18th century defendants were not permitted to be defended by counsel.4
Coming back to developments over the last decades it has become obvious that the
differences between the Continental type process and the Anglo-American procedure
are by far not as striking as commonly believed. It is suggested to take a more differ-
entiated refined look at the institutions we find in the two systems and by this some
traditionally shared assumptions primarily the inquisitorial-accusatorial dichotomy
* Professor, Central European University (Budapest).
1 See Damasˇka, Mirjan, Evidence Law Adrift, Yale University Press, 2013.
2 Damasˇka, Mirjan, The Quest for Due Process in the Age of Inquisition, LX The Ameri-
can Journal of Comparative Law 920 (Fall 2012).
3 Ibid, p. 937.
4 Ibid, p. 939.
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becomes weakened and prejudices may be eliminated. It is also attempted to identify
those principles that are common in the inquisitorial and the accusatorial proceed-
ings.
Spencer for instance, writes that commonly the accusatorial process is associated
with oral and public proceedings while it is believed that the inquisitorial process is
basically a secret procedure conducted in writing. In fact hearings on releasing the
defendant on bail are public, the media however may not provide information of these
hearings.5 He also notes that the media in England is prevented from reporting in-
criminating evidence before the verdict is rendered. This follows from the presump-
tion of innocence. However, following the first instance verdict the defendant be-
comes a convict even if the defense decides to appeal. On the Continent, on the con-
trary defendants lose their status as defendants only after the decision has become
final. Therefore, the presumption of innocence seems to be better protected on the
Continent in this respect.6
Summers, confining her review to Europe, identifies the values adopted in both
systems on the basis of the procedural codes adopted in the 19th century, the jurispru-
dence of English Courts and the works of the most influential legal scholars of the
century. The guiding principles recognized in both the accusatorial and the inquisi-
torial model are the separation of procedural functions, public and oral trial, the im-
mediacy principle (Unmittelbarkeitsprinzip), judicial independence and impartiali-
ty.7 One may argue that in spite of these common general principles the two systems
may operate in different ways. However, if we accept that there is agreement on the
fundamental principles, then the approximation or rapprochement of the two systems
is by far not hopeless. And in fact the legislative changes that have occurred over the
last decades show that the two systems have become closer to each other.
The demand for changes resulting in the rapprochement of the two models came
from “inside”: It was the recognition of the deficiencies in one’s own system that in-
duced the changes. But in reducing the differences also “external” factors played a
considerable role not least the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR or Strasbourg Court). I emphasize the judgments of the ECtHR because in
some of them traditional, fundamental institutions have been questioned concerning
their compliance with the requirements of a fair trial (article 6) enshrined in the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).8
5 Spencer, John R., Introduction, in Delmas-Marty, Mireille; Spencer, John R. (eds.), Eu-
ropean Criminal Procedures, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 21.
6 Ibid, p. 23.
7 Summers, Sarah J., Fair Trials. The European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the
European Court of Human Rights, Hart Publishing, 2007, see Part One of the book.
8 The European Convention on Human Rights entered into force on 3 September 1953.
And article 6 includes the following: 1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in
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The decisions in which the Strasbourg Court using the objective test9 found it in-
compatible with the right to an impartial tribunal, as enshrined in Art. 6. of the
ECHR, that the investigating judge or a member of the indictment chamber (chambre
d’accusation) sits on the trial bench10 have accelerated the process in the course of
which many countries have abandoned the institution of the investigating judge or
reduced their competence (authority).
These decisions have questioned the validity of the assumption which served as
the basis of introducing the institution of the investigating magistrate. The assump-
tion was that placing the pre-trial stage of the process under judicial supervision is the
guarantee of establishing the truth and of arriving at a just judgment. The judgments
of the ECtHR have also questioned the validity of the assumption according to which
judges be they investigating magistrates or members of the chambre d’accusation
due to their training, their independence guaranteed by legislation, their moral integ-
rity and their attitude acquired in the course of their professional socialization could
preserve their impartiality even if they perform investigative functions in the pre-trial
stage of the process.
Following the judgment in Borgers finding Belgium in violation of the equality of
arms principle several states were forced to give up their traditional position on the
status and procedural functions of the procureur général (avocat général) and make
the necessary amendments.11 Under Belgian law in force at the time of the Strasbourg
the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests of justice. 2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3. Everyone charged with a criminal
offence has the following minimum rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which
he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; (b) to have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; (c) to defend himself in person
or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for
legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; (d) to examine or
have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of wit-
nesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; (e) to have the free
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.
9 See for instance Demicoli v. Malta [13057/87 (27/08/1991)] para. 93–99: “[…] accor-
ding to an objective test, that is to say by ascertaining whether the tribunal itself and, among
other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in
respect of its impartiality. […] it must be determined whether, quite apart from the judge’s
conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to his impartiality. This
implies that, in deciding whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a
particular judge or a body sitting as a bench lacks impartiality, the standpoint of the person
concerned is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether this fear can be held to be
objectively justified.”
10 De Cubber v. Belgium 9186/80 (26/11/1984); Ben Yaacoub v. Belgium 9976/82 (30/11/
1987) (struck off the list judgment). The Commission in its Report delivered on 7 May 1985,
concluded that the right to an impartial tribunal had been violated.
11 Borgers v Belgium 12005/86 (30/10/1991).
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judgment in the proceedings before the Cour de Cassation the procureur général fol-
lowing the parties made his arguments to which the parties had no opportunity to
comment. The procureur général could also attend the deliberation of the Cour de
Cassation without the right to vote. According to the Government, Belgian law
was in line with the Convention since the procureur général unlike prosecutors acting
before lower courts was not a party to the case. His role was to advise the court to
provide help in drafting the judgment and contribute to the consistency of the court’s
case law. The Government also claimed that the impartiality of the procureur gén-
éral’s department was guaranteed due to the “independence it enjoyed vis-à-vis
the Minister of Justice.”12
Also, the dissenters of the ECtHR invoked the quasi judicial function of the pro-
cureur général and noted that there is broad consensus as to the status and the position
of the procureur général which is part of the legal tradition in Belgium. They claimed
that the participation of the procureur général at the deliberation of the court does not
jeopardize judicial independence and impartiality due to the traditions of the Belgian
judiciary and that judges in the course of their studies and training acquire skills that
make them unbiased decision makers.13
Judge Martens reminded his colleagues that not only Belgium but also other coun-
tries may be forced to amend the rules of procedure before the highest court should
the Strasbourg court find a violation.14 However the majority opined that fairness is a
higher value than the interest in preserving tradition.
In 2009 the Strasbourg Court in the Taxquet judgment questioned one of the fun-
damental features of the jury system, notably the unreasoned verdict of the jury.15
According to earlier Strasbourg jurisprudence the unreasoned verdict is not necessa-
rily contrary to Art. 6 of the Convention (see e.g., the decision of the European Com-
mission of Human Rights in the Zarouali-case16). The Court did not indicate unequiv-
ocally in Taxquet that the right to a fair trial is guaranteed exclusively through the
reasoned judgment. It found a violation because the judge addressed but a few broad-
ly formulated questions to the jury. Therefore, the defendant was not in a position to
assess which evidence the jurors found to be decisive when convicting him. However,
the Court noted that “according to its settled case-law judgments of courts and tribu-
nals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based” adding that the
“extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature
12 Ibid, para. 23.
13 See Judge’s Cremona, Thór Viljhalmsson, Martens, Pinheiro Farinha, Morenilla and
Storme dissenting opinion.
14 Judge Martens has mentioned France, Italy and the Netherlands in his dissenting opi-
nion.
15 Taxquet v. Belgium 926/05 (13/01/2009), Chamber Decision (Hereinafter: Taxquet
judgment (2009)).
16 Zarouali v. Belgium 20664/92 (29/07/1994).
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of the decision and must be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case.”17
The Strasbourg Court also noted that in the Zarouali and Papon cases18 it found no
violation “although the jury could answer only “yes” or “no” to each of the questions
put by the President.” However, the precision of the questions “sufficiently offsets the
fact that no reasons were given to the jury’s answers.”19
The Strasbourg Court thus ruled that the transparency of judgments and the fair-
ness of the process can also be guaranteed by other means than the reasons given for
the decision. Reading the passages of the judgment cited above, those who are in
favor of maintaining the English or the Irish jury system in its present form may
have felt relieved. In Ireland the trial judge gives instructions to the jury on all the
legal issues, the principles of criminal law and the elements of the criminal offense
the defendant is charged with. Trial judges would also give a summary of the evi-
dence. They would also provide “special directions (if necessary) concerning the in-
herent dangers attached to certain type of evidence.”20 Also in England and Wales the
judges of the Crown Court give a detailed summary of the facts to the jurors and in-
form them of the law “applicable to those facts”.21
However par. 43 of the Chamber judgment in Taxquet seems to suggest, that the
reasoned judgment has no alternative and that the provisions in Irish or English law
do not sufficiently guarantee the fairness of the trial. The Strasbourg Court observes
that since the Zaruali decision the case law has changed and in a number of Member
States the relevant provisions have been amended. As to the changes in Strasbourg
jurisprudence it is noted that “[…] the Court has frequently held that the reasoning
provided in court decisions is closely linked to the concern to ensure a fair trial as it
allows the rights of the defence to be preserved. Such reasoning is essential to the very
quality of justice and provides a safeguard against arbitrariness.”22 From among the
legislative changes in the Member States the Court made reference to France where
jury verdicts can now be appealed and therefore the motives of the verdict have to be
stated.
The inconsistency of the Taxquet judgment is also evidenced by the fact that courts
in Europe drew different conclusions from it. In Belgium the Court of Assizes in
Arlon concluded from Taxquet that juries are required to give reasons for their verdict
17 Taxquet judgment (2009), para. 40.
18 Papon v. France 54210/00 (25/07/2002).
19 Taxquet judgment (2009), para. 42.
20 The Irish government has referred to this when they have presented their views in the
Taxquet case as third parties. Daly, Tom, An Endangered Species?: The Future of the Irish
Criminal Jury System in Light of Taxquet v. Belgium, 1 New Journal of European Criminal
Law (2) 164 (2010).
21 Roberts, Paul, Does Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Require
Reasoned Verdicts in Criminal Trials? 11 Human Rights Law Review (2), 225 (2011).
22 Taxquet judgment (2009), para. 43
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by providing explanations for each of their answers.23 This position was shared by the
Central Criminal Court in Ireland in a widely publicized case.24
In Norway the Supreme Court drew a different conclusion from the Taxquet judg-
ment. It held that the judgment does not indicate any departure from earlier case law,
thus juries are not required to give reasons for their verdict. It pointed out that the
cause for finding a violation in Taxquet was that the questions addressed to the
jury by the president of the court were not sufficiently precise and detailed.25
Also, legal scholars commenting on the judgment came to different conclusions.
In Decaigny’s interpretation the judgment clearly puts juries under the duty to state
the reasons for their verdicts in order to avoid arbitrariness.26 Daly on the contrary
concluded that such a duty does not necessarily follow from the judgment.27
Following the Taxquet judgment the Belgian law of criminal procedure was
amended in order to ensure compliance with the ECHR, I will come back to this
later.28 At the same time the Government decided to refer the case before the
Grand Chamber and the Governments of the United Kingdom, Ireland and France
intervened as third parties. Roberts was right in noting that the third party intervenors
“had more practical interest in the Grand Chamber’s ruling than Belgium, the direct
respondent to the application.”29
In Ireland the Constitution guarantees the defendant’s right to be tried by jury.30
The constitutional elements may not be amended by a “simple” law of Parliament and
23 Daly, p. 161.
24 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Eamonn Lillis, Central Criminal Court Record,
No. 32/09, (05. 02. 2010)
25 Daly, pp. 161–162; According to Decaigny, several Belgian courts concluded from the
Taxquet judgment that the jury is under the obligation to give reasons for their verdicts and
tried to comply with this requirement. Decaigny, Tom, Can Juries Convict in Accordance with
the European Convention on Human Rights?, 1 New Journal of European Criminal Law (1) 12
(2010).
26 Decaigny, p. 10.
27 Daly, p. 163.
28 Already before the Taxquet judgment a Bill was prepared in 2008 which among others
stated that the Assize Courts have to give reasons for their decisions. It also permitted the
president of the Court to be present at the jurors’ deliberation and assist them. The Assize
Court Reform Act of 2009 which provided that Assize Courts must state the main reasons for
their decisions came into force on January 11, 2010. See. Taxquet v. Belgium 926/05 (16/11/
2010), Grand Chamber Decision (Hereinafter: Taxquet-judgment (2010)), paras. 35–36.
29 Roberts, p. 217.
30 Exceptions are known: “(i) minor offences may be dealt with by a judge sitting without a
jury, (ii) offences under military law may be tried by military tribunals sitting without a jury,
(iii) special courts may be used to try offences without a jury where the ordinary courts are
deemed inadequate secure to secure the effective administration of justice, and the preserva-
tion of public order.” (Daly, p. 154). The Belgian Constitution of 1831 provided serious
crimes, political and press offences are tried by juries.We find a similar provison in the 1994
Constitution: “The jury shall be constituted for all serious crimes and for political and press
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the secrecy of the deliberations and the ban on giving information on the deliberation
after the trial has been concluded, are among the constitutional elements of the jury
system. Also in England the secrecy of the deliberations is sacrosanct and inviolable
and a legal provision obliging jurors to give reasons for their verdicts would abandon
the principle.
The Grand Chamber agreed with the Chamber, in its unanimous judgment it found
a violation of Article 6 of the ECHR.31 However those who were anxious about the
future of the common law type jury might have felt relieved.32 Invoking its previous
judgments it noted that jurors are not required to give reasons and that “article 6 does
not preclude a defendant from being tried by a lay jury even where reasons are not
given for the verdict.”33
The ECtHR noted that it has no power to review how member states shape their
system of the administration of justice. It also observed that in numerous member
states of the Council of Europe the jury system exists in different forms depending
on the “history, tradition and legal culture” of the states.34 The Court’s position is that
the institution of the jury may not be called into question. It is for the Contracting
States to decide how to ensure the operation of their justice systems in compliance
with Article 6 of the Convention.35 The Grand Chamber made it clear that it follows
its previous jurisprudence and that Article 6 is not necessarily violated if jurors give
no reasons for their verdict.36
In his concurring opinion judge Jebens noted that the solutions adopted in various
jurisdictions with the aim to bring the jury system in line with the duty to give reasons
for the verdict do only formally comply with this requirement but in fact do not guar-
antee defendants’ right to be informed of the real reasons for their conviction. He
mentioned the legislative amendment in Belgium adopted in January 2010 after
the Chamber judgment in Taxquet. According to the amendment the judge and the
jurors formulate the judgment together. Decaigny rightly raises the question if the
professional judge would be willing to write down the actual reasons “if those reasons
offences, except for press offences motivated by racism and xenophobia.” (Taxquet judgment
(2010), par. 23). Also in Spain trial by jury was elevated to the rank of a constitutional right in
1978 (see Article 125 of the Constitution).
31 Taxquet judgment (2010).
32 However, according to some authors, certain passages of the Grand Chamber judgment
seem to suggest that in the long run the jury system in its present form may not be maintained.
The Taxquet judgment therefore “prompts broader critical reflections on the rationality and
legitimacy of unreasoned jury verdicts in criminal adjudication”. See Roberts, p. 213.
33 Taxquet judgment (2010), para. 90.
34 Ibid, para. 83.
35 Ibid, para. 84.
36 Ibid, para. 90.
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would jeopardize the legality of the decision”, for instance if the real motive of con-
viction was the racial attitude of the jurors.37
In Norway the Supreme Court in exceptional cases may instruct the High Courts to
indicate the evidence that was decisive for the defendant’s conviction. This is to be
given by the judges without the participation of the jurors.38 Since the judges are not
present at the deliberation of the jury it is highly questionable if the reasons given
reflect the opinion of the jurors.
I note that in 1996 legislators in Geneva adopted a similar solution: the law re-
quired jurors to give reasons for their responses to the questions addressed to
them but allowed them to seek the assistance of the greffier in formulating their rea-
sons. On the basis of the explanation of the jurors the professional bench drafted the
reasons for the judgment.39
In sum we may have serious doubts if the jury system can be reformed to guarantee
the defendant’s right to a reasoned judgment. This right is guaranteed only if the de-
fendant is informed about the genuine motives of the verdict. On the basis of the leg-
islative attempts he described, judge Jebens concludes that with a view to the partic-
ularities of the jury system the fairness of the trial can be guaranteed through other
mechanisms that compensate for the absence of the reasons.
The fact that the defendant and the community are not informed of the real mo-
tives of the decision is all the more disquieting since following the verdict it is pro-
hibited to conduct any inquiry in order to reveal what actually happened in the course
of the jurors’ deliberation. This rule of course has its justification. The prohibition
may ensure the open discussion of the jurors, it may protect them from eventual criti-
cism or retribution if they happened for instance to acquit a defendant charged with a
serious crime that provoked a public outcry. But because of the secrecy of the delib-
erations it can never be disclosed if the decision was rendered via coin-toss or some
sort of magic. It can never be revealed if jurors were motivated by racist attitudes.
Therefore, it cannot be ascertained if the defendant’s right to an impartial tribunal
as set forth in Article 6 of the ECHR was guaranteed.40
By briefly summarizing the Taxquet judgments my primary intention was to dem-
onstrate that the judgments of the ECtHR may induce member states to review tradi-
tional institutions the justification of which has not been questioned beforehand by
37 Decaigny also notes that “this praetorian method” could not guarantee the rights of
victims and the public, since in case of an acquittal the reasons are not registered. Decaigny,
pp. 12–13.
38 See Judge Jebens parallel reasoning in the Taxquet judgment (2010).
39 Thaman, Stephen C., Should Criminal Juries Give Reasons for Their Verdicts: The
Spanish Experience and the Implications of the European Court of Human Rights Decision in
Taxquet v. Belgium, 86 Chicago-Kent Law Review 627 (Issue 2).
40 For deep analysis of the question see Quinn, Catherine, Jury Bias and the European
Convention on Human Rights: A Well-kept Secret?, Criminal Law Review 998 –1014 (De-
cember 2004).
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this contributing to the approximation of legal systems. However, I cannot resist the
temptation to go on with the inquiry into the jury system. The reason is, that it calls for
an explanation why member states took legislative measures to put the obligation on
juries to give reasons for their verdicts, whereas as we saw it this is hardly compatible
with the particularities of the jury system and is not required by the case law of the
ECtHR either. Already in the 1990 s the ECtHR and the European Commission of
Human Rights that existed prior to reform of the Convention system through Protocol
11, took the position that Article 6 of the ECHR does not require that jurors state the
reasons for their verdicts and this was confirmed by the Taxquet judgment.41
In Taxquet the ECtHR even made proposals on how to guarantee the transparency
of the decision making process in the jury system and how to avoid the risk of arbi-
trariness which in trials conducted by professional judges is served by the duty to give
reasons. According to the ECtHR defendants’ right to be informed of the motives
behind their conviction can be guaranteed if the professional judge gives clear guid-
ance and puts precisely formulated questions to the jurors. By this the arbitrariness of
the decision can be avoided.42
In spite of this, as we saw, legislators in some member states thought that com-
pliance with the ECHR may be ensured only by putting the obligation on jurors to
state the reasons for their decisions. Legislators perhaps saw a certain contradiction
in that the ECtHR first formulated the right to a reasoned judgment as an implied
component of the right to a fair trial43 and then proclaimed that this right does not
have to be guaranteed in jury trials.
Of course both the explicit (the right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses)
and the implied components (equality of arms, the right to silence or the right to a
reasoned judgment) of the right to a fair trial can be restricted in the name of another
right or interest. The right to confront witnesses or the right to silence for instance
may be restricted but this can occur only on the condition that other safeguards pro-
vide adequate guarantees for preserving the overall fairness of the proceedings.
True, the ECtHR is more willing to accept the limitation of the implicit rights. This
follows from the nature of implied rights since it is the Court that designates the scope
of the given right and thereby also its inherent limits.44 However, both the explicit and
implied components are unqualified rights such as the right to a fair trial itself. In
contrast to the so called qualified rights (freedom of expression, freedom of associ-
ation, freedom of assembly etc.) where the permissibility of restriction is explicitly
mentioned, in the Convention a total deprivation cannot be compatible with the
41 For the presentation of the case law see the Taxquet judgment (2010), para. 85–91.
42 Ibid, para. 92.
43 See for example Van de Hurk v. Netherlands 16034/90 (19/04/1994).
44 Bárd, Károly, Fairness in Criminal Proceedings: Article Six of the European Human
Rights Convention in a Comparative Perspective, Budapest, Hungarian Official Journal Pu-
blisher, 2008, pp. 58 –61.
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ECHR: it is unacceptable that anyone should be deprived of his/her right to a fair trial
in the name of any other right or interest.
This is not the case with the qualified rights. Persons, who for national security
considerations, are interdicted from disseminating their writing or who are punished
for inciting to violence through their speech can rightfully claim that in the given case
they were deprived of their freedom of expression (they cannot claim, however, that
they are the victims of a human rights violation).
In contrast, there is no situation in which the right to a fair trial would have to back
down before another right or interest, without this constituting a human rights vio-
lation. This can clearly be explained by the fact that the right to a fair trial is composed
of numerous – explicit and implicit – elements, which themselves are not clearly de-
fined, and that the Strasbourg Court always evaluates the entirety of the given pro-
ceeding. The limitation of individual components does not necessarily render the
whole trial unfair as other elements may compensate for the deficiency. But as no
such exception can exist that would make an unfair proceeding acceptable, no
trial in which the accused was – in the name of another right or interest – totally de-
prived of a component of the right to a fair trial can be compatible with the Conven-
tion.
Now it seems that the ECtHR stated the contrary when ruling that the right to a fair
trial is not violated if the jury fails to give reasons for its verdict. However, the Court
did not make reference to any other right or interest that would make the total dep-
rivation of defendants of their right to a reasoned judgment acceptable in jury trials.
Perhaps the explanation lies in that the right to a reasoned judgment is purely instru-
mental. As the Court observed by giving reasons the risk of arbitrariness can be
avoided45 and this is the precondition for the community’s trust in the fair operation
of the criminal justice system.
Further, the reasoned judgment is the precondition of the effective exercise of the
right to appeal.46 By stating the reasons for their decisions courts give an account of
the intellectual process that made them arrive at the given conclusion. Being in-
formed of the reasons the defense is given the opportunity to draw the appellate
court’s attention to the deficiencies in this intellectual process. And the reasons
may disclose before the appellate court the factual and legal mistakes made by the
first instance court even without the initiative of the defense.
And finally stating the reasons for the judgment is the precondition of judicial im-
partiality. As noted by Theodor Meron: “judicial impartiality cannot be ensured with-
45 Taxquet judgment (2010), para. 92.
46 Harris, David; O’Boyle, Michael; Bates, Edward P; Buckley, Carla M., Law of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 268. In
criminal matters the right to appeal is included in Protocol No. 7, article 2 of the ECHR.
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out a reasoned decision. Giving clear reasons for a judgment and bringing to light the
judge’s reasoning process are essential safeguards against judicial wrongdoing.”47
If the right to a reasoned judgment is in fact instrumental then we may compre-
hend why the ECtHR is prepared to accept that defendants may completely be de-
prived of this right which is formulated as an implied component of the right to a
fair trial. If namely we can demonstrate that in the case that there have been other
instruments that serve the same purposes (excluding arbitrariness and by this ensur-
ing the community’s confidence in the administration of justice, guaranteeing the ef-
fective exercise of the right to appeal and judicial impartiality) as the right to a rea-
soned judgment, then we may state that there is no need for that right.
As to creating and maintaining trust in the administration of justice we may say
that in trials conducted by professional judges stating the reasons for the decision has
no alternative. However, the jury was born exactly out of distrust towards the profes-
sionals or to use a positive formulation out of the trust in the laymen, our peers, who
are like us. The jury is legitimized not by its rational way of procedure but by its com-
position and that it applies the norms shared by the community. It is the jury itself that
is the basis of the trust.
The statement of reasons for the judgment, as we saw, serves also the effective
exercise of the right to appeal. In the common law system, exactly because of the
absence of the jury’s duty to state the reasons for the verdict, the appeal court is rather
limited in reviewing the substantive correctness of the decision. However, the as-
sumption is that compliance with the procedural rules may guarantee that the jury
arrives at the correct decision. Adherence to the procedural rules can easily be ascer-
tained since all that happens in the course of the trial is documented in details, witness
statements are recorded verbatim.
Stating the reasons for the decision is also the guarantee of judicial impartiality.
The mere fact that judges know that they are under the obligation to give an account
on how they arrived at a certain conclusion encourages judges to proceed without
bias. In jury trials it is not the duty to state the reasons for the decision but the process
by which jurors are selected that serves as the guarantee of judicial impartiality. Both
the prosecution and the defense may challenge a certain number of potential jurors
without even giving reasons (peremptory challenge). After using the peremptory
challenges the parties have the opportunity to subject other potential jurors to inten-
sive interrogation and if they find that some of them may not be expected to deal with
the case without prejudice they may initiate their disqualification.48 Thus, it seems
that in the jury system there are institutions, “instruments” in place that serve the
47 Meron, Theodor, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tri-
bunals, 99 American Journal of International Law 360 (2005).
48 Another method to ensure impartiality is the change of venue in especially sensitive
cases. See Jackson, John D., Making Juries Accountable, 50 American Journal of Comparative
Law 481 (2002).
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same purposes as the right to a reasoned judgment. However, a deeper analysis is
needed in order to confirm the correctness of this assertion.
First, we may question the validity of the starting thesis, i. e., that the right to a
reasoned judgment is purely instrumental. According to Roberts “providing reasons
for decision is a basic tenet of rationality in decision-making with both instrumental
and intrinsic values.”49 The pressure to provide reasons is instrumental in that it is
likely to lead to higher quality decisions. But it also has intrinsic value in that it guar-
antees respect for human dignity. If it is explained to an individual why she/he has
been treated in a certain way and has the opportunity to contradict and present reasons
for reconsideration they are treated as autonomous, “sovereign agents, and not mere-
ly as an object who can be manipulated at the will of the authorities.”50
True, an argument in support of the jury is that it has an autonomous value. The
jury system is the reflection of democratic values in the administration of justice. Ac-
cording to Devlin “each jury is a little parliament,” and “is a symbol of participatory
democracy.”51 However, most authors conclude from this declaration that the jury is
rather instrumental: the participation of laymen makes the impression in people and
especially in the jurors themselves that justice is administered fairly. Jurors usually
believe that they have performed well and they are generally satisfied with their own
performance and are sent back “to their ordinary lives with a sense of the fairness and
propriety of the judicial process.”52 Thus the jury system is instrumental in the sense
that it strengthens the confidence in the justice system. But even if we accept that the
jury system has an autonomous value, the same is the case with the duty to give rea-
sons for the decision. By putting the duty on the judges to give account of the reasons
we recognize defendants as autonomous subjects.
A further question is whether today, when besides the independence also the ac-
countability of judges is stressed, the mere fact that defendants are tried by their
“peers” serves as a sufficient basis for the trust in the justice system. We may
argue that the era of “khadi justice” is over.53 We are not anymore willing to accept
49 Roberts, p. 215. At the same time the right to a reasoned judgment may also in this
context be considered as instrumental that can be substituted by other institutions. The ad-
versarial nature of the process which enables defendants to submit their arguments and to
question the credibility of incriminating evidence or the judge’s summary and his/her in-
structions addressed to the jurors on how they should proceed guarantee that defendants are
treated as subjects.
50 Ibid.
51 Devlin, Patrick, Trial by Jury, Stevens & Sons, London, 1956, p. 164, quoted in Dar-
byshire, Penny, The Lamp that Shows that Freedom Lives – Is it Worth the Candle? Criminal
Law Review 745 (October 1991).
52 Darbyshire, pp. 745–746. Darbyshire at the same time notes that many people try to
avoid jury service. And many of those who do not, report that the trial was boring and feel
frustrated. Ibid,, 746.
53 According to Weber, trial by jury is frequently khadi- justice. Weber, M., Economy and
Society, (Ed. by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich), University of California Press, 1978,
p. 813.
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adjudication according to judges’ instincts: we demand that they give an explanation
for their decision.
We may of course argue that the khadi’s decision is legitimized by the charismatic
character of the juridical prophet, whereas the verdict of the jury appears to be the
outcome of collective deliberation in the course of which jurors try to convince
each other through presenting rational arguments. If the size of the jury is sufficiently
large and unanimity is required we rightly may assume that the verdict is based on
rational considerations and this may induce confidence in the justice system. How-
ever, since the end of the 20th century the defendant can be convicted both in Ireland
and in England if at least ten out of the twelve jurors find his/her guilt to be proven
provided that the jury tried to reach a unanimous verdict deliberating at least for two
hours.54
Research indicates that if the agreement of a majority is sufficient for the decision
jurors attempt to arrive at a verdict within a short period of time and their goal “cen-
ters on arriving at a verdict category and fashioning a story to justify the decision
afterwards.”55 In contrast, if unanimity is required jurors will thoroughly analyze
and discuss the evidence and attempt to persuade those who have not yet formed
a firm opinion in order to ensure unanimity.56
The confidence in the jury and the correctness of its verdict is weakened also by
the fact that it is almost impossible to set up a jury representing all sections of the
community. Random selection does not guarantee representativeness. As Darbyshire
puts it “Random selection may throw up juries which are all male, all Conservative all
white.”57
The jury was born out of the distrust towards the professionals and the general
verdict that contained no reasons provided protection for the jurors against the pres-
sure of the professional judge or public opinion. Therefore, the general verdict was a
guarantee of the jurors’ independence. In addition, the jury by applying the norms
shared by the community and not being under pressure to give reasons could correct
unjust and draconian laws.
Today professional judges are perhaps less abhorred than earlier and criminal laws
are certainly swifter than two or three centuries before. Therefore, several authors
54 See O’Hanlon, R. J., The Sacred Cow of Trial by Jury, in: Brooks, Thom (Ed.), The
Right to a Fair Trial, Farnham-Burlington, Ashgate, 2009, p. 7.
55 Brooks, Thom, The Right to Trial by Jury, in: Brooks, Thom (Ed.), The Right to a Fair
Trial, Farnham-Burlington, Ashgate, 2009, p. 87.
56 Ibid.
57 Darbyshire, p. 745. This can be corrected by challenging some potential jurors. How-
ever, the parties’ aim is not to have a representative jury to be set up but rather a decision
making body which is likely to rule in their favor. It should be noted that in earlier times the
jury was even less representative. In 1956 Lord Devlin observed that the majority of the jurors
were middle aged, middle class men and since they shared certain values it was relatively easy
to reach unanimity. Cited by O’ Hanlon, p. 6.
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question the jury’s right recognized exclusively in the common law system to ignore
the law and substitute it for their conscience (jury nullification). As Darbyshire points
out it is for the elected Parliament and the Law Lords to re-write the laws.58
According to O’Hanlon putting laws aside may be justified in oppressive and au-
tocratic regimes but is “indefensible in a modern democracy where fundamental
rights and freedoms are protected by the country’s constitution.”59 The members
of the jury, he writes, “take an oath that they will deliver true verdicts according
to the evidence” will break their oath “by refusing to give effect to the law of the
land”.60 Juries “have usurped the role of parliament which is entrusted by the people
with the task of making laws which are in conformity with the will of the people.”61
The argument in support of jury nullification that the law may be put aside in order
to enforce community norms is less convincing today since in less homogeneous so-
cieties we hardly can speak of commonly shared community values.62 It is worth not-
ing that also Lord Justice Auld in his review of the criminal courts in England and
Wales63 draws attention to the contradiction that on the one hand jurors take the
oath to apply the law but on the other may acquit or convict “in defiance of the
law and in disregard of their oath”.64
Lord Justice Auld makes the proposal to prohibit juries by statute to acquit defend-
ants by disregarding the law or the evidence presented.65 Should his proposal appear
too radical he suggests as an alternative to acknowledge openly the jurors’ right to put
aside the law. The judge would instruct jurors that they may decide according to their
conscience and are not obliged to render a verdict of guilt if they disagree with the law
or find the prosecution unfair. This solution would be more honest and would solve
the contradiction that jurors take the oath to apply the law but may ignore it. As ex-
amples Lord Auld refers to the Constitutions of Indiana and Maryland, which confer
upon the jury the right to determine not only the facts but also what the law is.66
At the same time numerous lawyers in the United States question the right of the
jury to disregard the law. Some judges disqualify those jurors who are in favor of
58 Darbyshire, p. 750.
59 O’Hanlon, p. 14.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Jackson, p. 479.
63 Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales 2001. The report was prepared
upon the request of the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Attorney General): http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.criminal-courts-review.org.uk/ccr-00.htm
(Hereinafter, Auld, Review).
64 Auld, Review, Chapter 5: Juries, para. 105.
65 Ibid, para. 107.
66 Ibid, para. 108.
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“jury nullification” and conduct an inquiry if they receive information of the jury’s
intent to decide against the law.67
Judicial independence and impartiality are frequently invoked to justify that juries
are not under the obligation to give information of the motives of their decisions. It is
in the name of independence and impartiality that no one may inquire after verdict of
the reasons for the decision.68
However, we tend to reassess the relation between independence and accountabil-
ity. We believe that accountability does not curtail independence but the two comple-
ment each other. Independence means that judges subject themselves exclusively to
the law and by making them accountable we wish to ascertain that they in fact sub-
jected themselves to the law and have not disregarded it. True, the common law jury is
not obliged to subject itself to the law but as indicated earlier the justification of jury
nullification has been questioned in recent times exactly in the name of accountabil-
ity. Also, Lord Auld makes the proposal to empower the appellate court to conduct an
investigation on what has happened during the jury deliberation if the suspicion of
some impropriety arises.69
Regarding the requirement of impartiality there may be doubts if the process of the
selection of jurors provides sufficient guarantee. In England since 1988, when the
right of challenging jurors without assigning a reason for challenge (peremptory
challenge) was abolished, the parties have less influence on the composition of
the jury. Where the institution of peremptory challenge still exists,70 it is very likely
that a non-representative jury will set up which may raise doubts on its impartiality or
at least make it appear to be biased. In the United States prosecutors and defense
councils employ refined methods of subjecting prospective jurors to examination in-
terrogating. Their aim is not only to disqualify individuals who are likely to be hostile
to the defendant or the victim but to ensure that a jury is set up which will probably
decide in their favor.71 In addition, in the United States the institution of peremptory
challenge still exists and with some exaggeration we may say that the outcome of the
67 Jackson, p. 481.
68 In England, according to section 8 of the 1981 Contempt of Court Act it is contempt to
obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made, opinions expressed, arguments
advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in any legal
proceedings. The position of the House of Lords is that not even senior Court of Appeal
judges, may inquire after verdict into allegations of jury bias even when there is a possible
miscarriage of justice. R. v. Mirza (Shabbir Ali) [2004] UKHL 2, 1 A.C. 1118. Quoted by
Thornton, Peter, 50th Anniversary Article. Trial by Jury: 50 Years of Change, Criminal Law
Review 689 (September 2004). The secrecy of jury deliberation was seen also as a guarantee
of ’frank discussion and expression of views’ (see Brooks, p. 91).
69 Auld, Review, para. 98. This of course would call for the amendment of Article 8 of the
1981 Contempt of Court Act.
70 Like in Ireland or in the United States of America.
71 This was observed already by Devlin in his work published in 1956 (Trial by Jury), cited
by O’Hanlon, pp. 13–14.
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case is not determined by the cogency of the arguments put forward by the parties, but
rather by their skills that enable them to have a jury set up which will rule in their
favor, that is a biased and not impartial jury.72
Finally, we may doubt if in the absence of reasons the verdict of the jury may be
challenged only the ground of procedural deficiencies the right to appeal as set forth
in Protocol No.7 to the ECHR really guaranteed. According to Article 2 of the Pro-
tocol “everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to
have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal.” It seems that the leg-
islators in the United Kingdom also had doubts and that is why the UK not only failed
to ratify but even refused to sign Protocol No. 7.73
It should be noted however, that in England and Wales the appellate judges may in
principle in addition to procedural irregularities annul the jury’s verdict if for some
other reason they think that the defendant’s conviction was wrongful. At the same
time this rarely happens if the defense cannot refer to any procedural defect in the
trial.74 Also in Ireland the defense may appeal against the guilty verdict on grounds
other than procedural irregularities as well. However, Daly notes that “the scope of
appeal is narrowed by the lack of a reasoned verdict and the reluctance of courts to
pierce the veil of secrecy covering jury deliberations, even when significant juror
misbehavior is alleged.”75
In spite of this the scope of appeal is still broader in England and in Ireland than in
Belgium where ordinary appeal is not provided against the verdict of the jury76 and
the Court of Cassation deals exclusively with points of law. According to Art. 352 of
the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure the professional judges shall stay proceed-
ings and adjourn the trial if they are unanimously persuaded that jurors have made a
substantive error without violating the rules of procedure. Should they decide so, the
case will be considered by a new jury. However, as admitted by the Belgian govern-
ment in Taxquet this option “has been used on only three occasions”.77
In my paper I attempted to asses if there are in fact inconsistencies in Strasbourg
jurisprudence and in the Taxquet judgments regarding the right to a reasoned judg-
ment. In its earlier decisions the Court ruled that the right to a reasoned judgment is an
implied component of the right to a fair trial and then in the context of jury trials it
held that no reasons have to be given. Also in Taxquet the Court at some points stated
72 For an insightful presentation of the jury selection process in the United States of
America, see Fletcher, George P., A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz and the Law on
Trial, The University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 84 –99.
73 The Protocol has not been ratified by Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey either, but
the UK is the only State Party which has not even signed it, indicating that she is not prepared
to accept the binding effect of the Protocol.
74 Roberts, p. 224.
75 Daly, p. 164.
76 This was the rule also in France until 2000. See Roberts, p. 224.
77 Taxquet judgment (2010), paras. 31 and 99.
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that juries are not required to give reasons for their verdicts but indicated that reason-
ing is essential to the quality of justice and is a safeguard against arbitrariness.
The right to a fair trial is an unqualified right as are the components, be they ex-
plicit or implied. This means that unlike in the case of qualified rights such as free-
dom of expression, association, or the right to private life, a total deprivation of the
right is unacceptable. There can be restrictions on the components of the right to fair
trial, but the total deprivation is contrary to the Convention.
However, the Taxquet judgment suggests that the right to a reasoned judgment can
be completely abandoned. In order to explain the position of the Court I set out from
the assumption that contrary to other fairness rights, such as the right to counsel, the
right to be informed of the charges, etc. the right to a reasoned judgment is instru-
mental.
The reasons given for the judgment serve first as a guarantee against arbitrariness
which is a precondition of creating and maintaining trust in the administration of jus-
tice. The reasons may reveal the deficiencies of the fact finding process or in the ap-
plication of the law to the facts established which is, in turn, a precondition for the
effective exercise of the right to appeal. I argued that in case there are other institu-
tions in the jury system through which these aims can be accomplished then there is
no need for juries to give reasons for their verdicts.
The first round of the inquiry seemed to suggest that there are in fact “instruments”
in the common law jury system through which the objectives to be served by the rea-
soned judgment can be accomplished. However, a more in depth analysis raised
doubts regarding the alternatives to a reasoned judgment that could ensure the fair-
ness of the trial. Thus, in the light of the Taxquet judgment the fate of the common law
jury is still uncertain.
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